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1Sarbanes Oxley, Non Audit Services and the Mandatory Rotation of Audit 
Firms
ABSTRACT
Whilst the benefits and potentials of the dual roles assumed by external auditors are emphasized, 
as  well  as  the  need  to  ensure  that  safeguards  operating  to  guard  against  a  compromise  of 
objectivity and independence are in place, this paper also highlights the fact that even though 
such dual roles are appropriate in certain cases – as illustrated by justifications for limitations 
imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act and other relevant and applicable legislation –  instances 
also persist where section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley, with regard to internal audit outsourcing, may 
have been over-reactionary and may continue to hinder both companies and their auditors.
Key  Words:  independence,  objectivity,  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act,  FSMA section  166,  non  audit 
services
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Marianne Ojo1
Introduction
This paper considers the dual roles of  external auditors : whether acting in the dual capacity of 
external  auditor  and  internal  auditor  (with  respect  to  internal  and  external  audits),   does 
significantly or not significantly, affects the objectivity and independence attributes required  in 
exercising their functions.
It is also important to highlight that a consideration of the dual roles of the external auditor and 
internal  auditor  will  involve  examining  whether  it  is  appropriate  for  the  external  auditor  to 
incorporate internal audit responsibilities in certain circumstances (as provided for by ISA 610, 
Using the Work of Internal Auditors,  as well as provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act which 
imposes limitations on external auditors' abilities to perform in a dual capacity - particularly with 
respect to internal audit outsourcing services). It will consider the impact of the performance in 
such a dual capacity on the ability of the external and internal audit work to be carried out with 
the required attributes of objectivity and independence.
With respect to the above paragraph, focus will therefore be placed on the perspective of the 
external auditor performing internal audit functions - although the paper will also consider to a 
great extent,  internal audit  concepts,  the internal audit  function and certain definitions. Even 
though it is widely argued that the auditor's independence is compromised where particular non 
audit service functions are performed, certain benefits can also be derived where a dual capacity 
and the performance of dual roles are undertaken. Further, the prohibition of certain non audit 
services, does not necessarily imply that conflicts of interests will be mitigated – as this paper 
will seek to demonstrate. 
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3The structure of this paper is organised as follows. The ensuing section  recalls the concepts of 
integrity, independence and objectivity and is aimed at highlighting their significance as ethical 
values and attributes in the exercise of audit and accounting functions. Section B then illustrates 
how  the  focus  within  accounting  and  audit  roles  have  changed  over  the  years,  as  well  as 
highlights why there is need for a return to, and focus on traditional auditing techniques.  Certain 
duties  and  responsibilities  which  the  auditor  is  capable  of  undertaking  and  is  permitted  to 
undertake by law, as well as prohibited activities under various legislation will be considered 
under section C. The subsequent section (D), then considers the dual role of the external auditor 
as a skilled person, as well as safeguards which are in place to ensure that a compromise of 
independence and objectivity, whilst performing delegated functions, does not occur. 
4A. Non Audit Services and Audit Independence
The  APB (Auditing  Practices  Board)  Ethical  Standards  12 and  5  (Revised),  particularly,  are 
concerned  with  the  integrity,  objectivity  and  independence  of  auditors.  As  regards  the 
independence of auditors and the provision of non audit services, APB Standard 5 (Revised )3 
Non Audit  Services  Provided to Audited Entities,  provides  exclusively for safeguards  which 
should be in place if the auditor's independence is not to be compromised.
Paragraphs 10 and  13  of the APB's Ethical Standard 1 (Revised) respectively distinguishes 
between objectivity and independence. In particular, paragraph 13 states that:
"Independence  is  freedom  from situations  and  relationships  which  make  it  probable  that  a 
reasonable and informed third party would conclude that objectivity either is impaired or could 
be impaired. Independence is related to and underpins objectivity. However, whereas objectivity 
is  a  personal  behavioral  characteristic  concerning  the  auditor’s  state  of  mind,  independence 
relates to the circumstances surrounding the audit, including the financial, employment, business 
and personal relationships between the auditor and the audited entity and its connected parties."
Other definitions of independence have been provided as follows (Beattie, Fearnley and Brandt; 
2001):4 
2  See Auditing Practices Board, Ethical Standards 1(Revised) http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/APB/ES-1-(Revised)-Integrity,-objectivity-and-independ.aspx
3 APB, Ethical Standard 5 (Revised), Non Audit Services Provided to Audited Entities https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/APB/ES-5-(Revised)-Non-audit-services-provided-to-audi.aspx
4
4
 V Beattie, S Fearnley and R Brandt, Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit Is Really About (Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales), 2001 at page 19
5- "the conditional probability of reporting a discovered breach" by DeAngelo; the ability to resist 
client  pressure  (Knapp):  a  function  of  character  -  with  characteristics  of  integrity  and 
trustworthiness being essential (Magill and Previts); and an absence of interests that create an 
unacceptable risk of bias - this definition being provided by the AICPA White Paper definition 
(AICPA,  1997)  which  defines  independence  as  an  absence  of  interests  that  create  an 
unacceptable risk of bias.
The  Institute  of  Internal  Auditors  (IIA)'s  published  framework  of  independence  lists  seven 
threats to audit independence (which are similar to those threats faced by external auditors) and 
these threats include:5
- Self review threat
- Social pressures
- Economic interests
- Personal relationships
- Familiarity threat
- Cultural, racial and gender biases
- Cognitive biases
The Auditing Practices Board's Ethical Standard 5 (paragraph 25) also identifies the following 
principal types of threats to the auditor’s objectivity and independence :6
• self-interest threat 7
5
5
 J Stewart and N Subramaniam, " Internal Audit Independence and Objectivity: Emerging Research 
Opportunities" January 2010 at page 7
6 See paragraph 25 https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/ES-5-(Revised)-Non-audit-services-
provided-to-audi.aspx
6• self-review threat 8
• management threat
• advocacy threat9
• familiarity (or trust) threat
• intimidation threat
The focus on ownership rules of audit firms, derives not only from consequences emanating for 
audit  market  concentration,  but  also  from  the  impact  generated  on  auditor  independence. 
Employee ownership, as well as “the resulting profit sharing amongst senior auditors” serves as 
good signaling mechanism of the quality of audit services to the market.10 The importance of 
retaining audit quality is also a concern in the bid to provide greater access,expansion and entry 
to the audit market. Would the admission of more players from the mid tier audit firms into the 
audit  market generate more positive impacts and consequences for audit  independence? It  is 
certainly  the  case  that  increased  audit  concentration  within  the  audit  market  certainly  has 
consequences for audit  independence since  there is less choice and competition between the 
7
7
 " A self-interest threat arises when the auditor has financial or other interests which might cause the auditor 
to be reluctant to take actions that would be adverse to the interests of the audit firm or any individual in a position 
to influence the conduct or outcome of the audit (for example, where the auditor has an investment in the audited 
entity, is seeking to provide additional services to the audited entity or needs to recover long-outstanding fees from 
the audited entity)", see ibid.
8
8
 " A self-review threat arises when the results of a non-audit service performed by the auditor or by others 
within the audit firm are reflected in the amounts included or disclosed in the financial statements (for example, 
where the audit firm has been involved in maintaining the accounting records, or undertaking valuations that are 
incorporated in the financial statements). In the course of the audit, the auditor may need to re-evaluate the work 
performed in the non-audit service. As, by virtue of providing the non-audit service, the audit firm is associated with 
aspects of the preparation of the financial statements, the auditor may be (or may be perceived to be) unable to take 
an impartial view of relevant aspects of those financial statements", ibid.
9
9
 This arises when "the audit firm undertakes work that involves acting as an advocate for an audited entity 
and supporting a position taken by management in an adversarial context (for example, by acting as a legal advocate 
for the audited entity in litigation or a regulatory investigation). In order to act in an advocacy role, the audit firm 
has to adopt a position closely aligned to that of management. This creates both actual and perceived threats to the 
auditor’s objectivity and independence", ibid.
10 See European Commision, “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their Consequences For Audit Market 
Concentration” at page 88
7firms in the market,  as  well  as  devastating consequences,  in  respect  of  systemic  risk,  if  the 
demise of another Big Four audit firm, should occur.
Joint audits, that is, mid tier firms carrying out joint audits with Big Four firms, as a means of 
increasing their presence at international level, is considered “the priority step in tackling the 
concentration  issue”.11 Whether  such  audits  can  also  facilitate  greater  levels  of  audit 
independence also constitutes an interesting matter.
B. Changing Roles of Internal and External Auditors and Post Enron Consequences: 
Why  A  Return to More Traditional Auditing Techniques is Required
As well as evidence which suggests that the internal auditor's role has changed in recent years to 
one of a consultant nature, in contrast to that of a policing role,12 evidence has also been provided 
to  support  the  fact  that  the  external  auditor's  role  changed  during  the  nineties  from  that 
synonymous to a watch dog to a less vigilant and scrutinising role (Cunningham; 2006).13 Such 
evidence which include: 
− Firstly, the widening scope of audit firm services beyond the audit function - which has 
resulted  in  relationships  which  have  affected  audit  firms'  independence,14 secondly, 
increase in accounting irregularities during the 1990s which have arisen in the form of 
11  European Commission, Study on the effects of the implementation of the "acquis" on statutory audits of annual 
and consolidated accounts including the consequences on the audit market (2011) at page 6 of 9
     http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/reform/  
12
1
 J Stewart and N Subramaniam, " Internal Audit Independence and Objectivity: Emerging Research 
Opportunities" January 2010 at page 13
13
 See L Cunningham, "Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry 
Before it  Unravels" Boston College Law School Faculty Papers Paper 165 (2006) at page 23. Also see M Ojo, 
General Literature on the Audit Expectations Gap, Journal of Forensic Accounting, Vol. VIII, Nos. 1 & 2, January-
December 2007 
14
8widespread premature revenue recognition and other forms of creative accounting, and 
thirdly, evidence of auditor ability to influence audit quality and liability risk.15
Traditional auditing techniques focus on internal controls and demonstrate the auditor's thorough 
reputation as compared to the lax and complacent attitude which has been evidenced through 
recent increases in creative accounting practices and the widespread use of off balance sheet 
instruments  as  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Enron.  For  this  reason,  a  return  to  and  focus  on 
traditional auditing techniques, as well as auditing techniques which focus on internal controls is 
a much needed move - whilst also supporting audits which also take into consideration, strategic 
and operational controls. Such a stance would be greatly facilitated in cases where an external 
auditor is able to undertake certain permitted internal audit responsibilities.
A return to traditional auditing techniques is also advocated for, since, as will be illustrated in the 
following section, it has been argued that many Post Enron reforms, notably the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act,  do not  go far  enough in  their  efforts  to  address  the issue of  independence  – primarily 
through the prohibition of particular non audit services.
C. Limitations On the Use of Internal Audit Work and the Assumption of Internal  
Audit Roles - As Performed By External Auditors
In order to prevent or avoid situations where over reliance on internal audit work could result in 
a compromise of the external auditor's objectivity, certain safeguards serve to assist in "clarifying 
the circumstances where the work of the internal audit function cannot be used and therefore is 
 
 see L Cunningham, page 24; This also supports the argument put forward that increased interest in the 
objectivity and independence of internal audits is linked to "the evolving and expanding role of internal audit as a 
key corporate governance mechanism, as well as an internal consultancy service"  J Stewart and N Subramaniam 
page 4; and the statement that "the scope of internal audit  has expanded in recent times to encompass operational 
and strategic controls and is moving away from the traditional finance audits - hence there is a reducing scope for 
reliance which however, depends on individual internal audit departments" see A Garrett,  "The Role of Internal 
Audits in External Audits" CAE Conference, Abu Dhabi 2013 18 November 2012.
15
1
 see L Cunningham, pages 24 and 25
9prohibited." Such instances, as provided for by the ISA 610 (Revised), paragraphs 14] are as 
follows:16
- Where the function’s organizational status and relevant policies and procedures do not 
adequately support the objectivity of internal auditors; 
- Where the function lacks sufficient competence; or 
- Where the function does not apply a systematic and disciplined approach, including quality 
control. 
According  to  Paragraph  9  of  the  INTERNATIONAL STANDARD  ON  AUDITING  610 
(REVISED),17 the external auditor's sole responsibility for the audit opinion expressed, is not 
reduced  by  the  external  auditor’s  use  of  the  work  of  the  internal  audit  function  on  the 
engagement. 
Paragraph 24 also expressly states that the following information should be included in the audit 
documentation - where the external auditor incorporates the work of the internal audit function:
16  See [ISA 610 (Revised), paragraph 14] and IFAC, "Basis for Conclusions, Prepared by the Staff of the IAASB" 
ISA 610 (Revised), Using the Work of Internal Auditors, and ISA 315 (Revised), Identifying and Assessing the 
Risks of Material Misstatement through Understanding the Entity and Its Environment March 2012  at pages 6 
and 7.  Furthermore,  "Ensuring there are adequate safeguards  against  over  or  undue use of  the work of  the 
internal  audit  function  (where  use  is  permissible)  by  strengthening  the  external  auditor’s  decision-making 
framework for determining the planned nature and extent of work of the internal audit function that can be used. 
In particular, more clearly articulating in the requirements that the external auditor must make all significant 
judgments in the audit engagement, and plan to use less of the work of the internal audit function and perform 
more of the work directly in circumstances where the assessed risk of material  misstatement is higher with 
special consideration given to risks identified as significant. Similarly, for the other factors,  elevating application 
material to incorporate in the requirement how the factors should influence the auditor’s judgments." [ISA 610 
(Revised), paragraphs 15-16]
17
1
 USING THE WORK OF INTERNAL AUDITORS 
(Effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 2013).
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- Evaluation of whether the function’s organizational status and relevant policies and procedures 
adequately  support  the  objectivity  of  the  internal  auditors;  the  level  of  competence  of  the 
function;  and  whether  the  function  applies  a  systematic  and  disciplined  approach,  including 
quality control.
- The nature and extent of the work used and the basis for that decision; and 
- The audit procedures performed by the external auditor to evaluate the adequacy of the work 
used.
Outsourcing and Co Sourcing of Internal Audit Services
As highlighted in the previous sections, there are certain duties and responsibilities which the 
external auditor is capable of undertaking and permitted to undertake by law. Under the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, the prohibition of the external auditor's capacity to perform dual roles in respect of 
performing  certain  non  audit  services  which  include  internal  audit  outsourcing  services,  is 
highlighted.
Section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 lists certain prohibited services which do not lie 
within  the  scope  of  practice  of  external  auditors  of  U.S  public  companies.  The  prohibited 
services18 are based on three primary criteria, namely:
i) An auditor cannot function in the role of management;
ii) An auditor cannot audit his or her work; and
iii) An auditor cannot serve in an external advocacy role for the client.
Internal audit outsourcing services constitute one of the services listed as prohibited and even 
though  the  provision  of  such  services  by  external  auditors  to  their  clients  is  no  longer 
18
1
 Prohibited services include: 
- Book keeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements of the client 
whose statements are being audited;
- Financial reporting systems design and implementation;
- Internal audit outsourcing services.
11
permissible, it is reported by Ernst and Young (2006)19 that public accounting and specialist firms 
provide these services to non audit clients. 
Section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley, with regard to internal audit outsourcing, may have been over-
reactionary and may continue to hinder both companies and their auditors. Furthermore,various 
shortcomings of the Sarbanes Oxley Act have been identified which include:20 The inability of 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act to address the issue of independence of mind through a focus on actual 
conflicts of interests faced by auditors; ii)  the fact that the Act still  permitted audit  firms to 
undertake tax consultancy work – even though it prohibited the same firms from carrying out 
some non audit services;iii) that although the Act required rotation of the audit partner, it did not 
require rotation of the audit firm; and iv) the failure of the Act to address the “very common 
occurrence” of individual auditors moving from their firms to their clients.
In jurisdictions with developed audit markets, such as the UK and the U.S, the issue of “client 
switching” and the incidence whereby mandatory audit  rotation is  not undertaken by certain 
audit firms is of particular concern. Furthermore, even though the Sarbanes Oxley Act is U.S 
Law, its impact on global audit practices is evident. Two reasons which are attributed to this 
include:21
− Firstly, the fact that many multinational companies have a US listing and are therefore 
directly affected by the Act;
− Secondly, regulators, auditors and companies in many other jurisdictions have adopted 
similar rules to the Sarbanes Oxley Act – for example, Ethical Standards 5 (as discussed 
19
1
 See J Stewart and N Subramaniam, " Internal Audit Independence and Objectivity: Emerging Research 
Opportunities" January 2010 at page 17 and Ernst &Young, Trends in Australian and New Zealand Internal  
Auditing, Third Annual Benchmarking Survey 2006, Ernst & Young, Australia.
20 See European Commision, “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their Consequences For Audit Market 
Concentration” at page 52; Moore et al (2006) page 14 cited
     http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/market/oxera_report_en.pdf  
21 See European Commission, “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their Consequences For Audit Market 
Concentration” at page 5
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under section A), of the UK FRC's Auditing Practices Board which prohibits audit firms 
from undertaking certain types of non audit work for companies they audit, and requires 
certain safeguards to be in place to isolate audit from non audit work. 
Is section 201 of Sarbanes-Oxley, with regard to internal audit outsourcing over-reactionary? - 
and  could  it  continue  to  hinder  both  companies  and  their  auditors?
The following sections relating to knowledge spill-over gains, cost management and financial 
reporting quality further illustrate why section 201 may not fully serve its purpose.
Knowledge Spillover Gains
Knowledge spillover is the result of accounting firms benefiting from the relationship between 
the audit and non-audit services offered to their clients.  In the case of internal audit outsourcing, 
the  efficiency  of  financial  audits  is  bolstered  because  the  auditor  is  able  to  benefit  from 
knowledge gained during the performance of internal audit functions.  The auditor is able to gain 
a  better  understanding  of  the  client’s  internal  controls  because  the  auditor  has  had  close 
experience with the internal control environment as part of the client’s internal audit function. 
As stated earlier, the auditor is better equipped during the financial audit and the amount of work 
needed to document internal controls, assess control risk, and design tests of control is reduced. 
(Aldhizer, 2003)  
Cost Management
Audit firms are not the only party to monetarily benefit from the outsourcing of internal audit. 
Companies that outsource their internal audit function may reap potential cost benefits as well. 
In the article “Internal Audit Outsourcing” Aldhizer and Cashell (2003) explain:
For  companies,  outsourcing  the  internal  audit  function  offers  potential  cost  benefits. 
Internal audit outsourcing may reduce overlapping positions and audit effort by creating 
more  flexibility  in  increasing  and  decreasing  workloads.   Additionally,  outsourcing 
allows a company to replace "fixed" cost employees with "variable" fees for services. 
Finally,  a  wide  range  of  expertise  is  available  from  large  firms  that  would  be  too 
expensive for a company to maintain internally. 
13
Accounting Risk Management and Financial Reporting Quality
An investigation  by Prawitt et., al. (2011) found evidence that suggested that high quality 
internal audit functions (regardless of outsourcing) are associated with lower accounting risk. 
Furthermore,  Prawitt  et.  Al.  (2003) found that companies that  outsourced their  internal audit 
function to their external auditor prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley had lower accounting 
risk than companies that outsourced their internal audit function to another third-party service 
provider and companies that maintained their own in-house internal audit function.
Based on an empirical analysis of the relationship between restatements and non-audit 
fees paid by a client to its external auditor, it was found that companies that were not required to 
restate their financial statements paid more in internal audit outsourcing fees to their external 
auditors than companies that did, in fact, have to record material restatements (Prawitt et. Al. 
2003).  This evidence suggests a negatively correlating relationship between the outsourcing of 
internal audit functions and the occurrence of material financial restatements.
Arguments have also been put forward to bolster the stance that "an outsourced provider may be 
more independent than an in-house internal audit function since it is difficult for an employee to 
be truly independent of management, and that on the other hand, there also factors which could 
affect  the  objectivity  of  outsourced  providers  in  the  same  manner  that  external  auditor 
independence can be compromised."22 It  is  also argued  that  "regardless of whether  external 
assurance is obtained for sustainability reports (which contain a combination of quantitative23 
and qualitative data), that internal audit can play a role in verifying this data for management 
purposes."
22
2
 For instance, where the audit firm is dependent on a client for a major source of income and would not 
wish to lose such a client, self review threats etc; see ibid at pages 17 and 18
23
 Furthermore, "where information being verified is not quantifiable, internal auditors could face objectivity 
threats arising from social pressure and familiarity." see ibid at page 21
14
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) also recommends a list of factors to be considered when 
assessing  potential  outsourcing  engagements:24 available  resources,  size  of  the  organization, 
types of outsourcing alternatives,  Law, Statute,  or regulation (since some companies may be 
prohibited  by statute  or  regulation  from outsourcing internal  audit  services  to  their  external 
auditors),  taking  into  consideration  an  analysis  of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
outsourcing, as well as the following:25 
- Independence of the external service providers
- Allegiance of in-house resources versus that of external service provider
- Professional standards followed by the external service provider
- Qualifications of the service provider
- Staffing – training, turnover, rotation of staff, management
- Flexibility in staffing resources to meet engagement needs or special requests
- Availability of resources
- Retention of institutional knowledge for future assignments
There have been further evidence and arguments aimed at bolstering the view that conflicts of 
interests do not necessarily result from the proportion of non audit services (NAS) fees compared 
24
2
 Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), "The Role of Internal Auditing in Resourcing the Internal Audit 
Activity" IIA Position Paper January 2009 pages 4 and 5 https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/Public
%20Documents/IPPF_PP_Role_of_IA_in_Resourcing_the_IAA_01-09.pdf
25
 Other factors to be considered include "access to best practice or insight to alternative approaches; culture 
of the organization – receptiveness to external service providers; insight into the organization by the external service 
provider; coverage of remote locations; coordination with in-house internal  auditing;  coordination with external 
auditor; use of internal auditing as a training ground for internal promotions; retention, access to and ownership of 
work papers; acquisition and availability of specialty skills; cost considerations; and good standing membership in 
an appropriate professional organization." see ibid
15
to the audit fees, but from the fact that by performing two kinds of services, the audit is serving 
two kinds of clients.26  Even though such arguments have their merits, the fact that an audit firm 
which derives a significant percentage of its income and means of sustenance from a particular 
NAS or client, is likely to be influenced and dominated by such dependence, cannot be denied . 
It is certainly true that an audit firm may be compelled to “rename” a NAS in order to avoid 
being caught or “captured” by the prohibited list of NAS (as is mandated by section 201 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act).  Hence it  could be effectively argued that despite the list  of prohibited 
services, section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act may not fully achieve its aims.
D. External Auditors Also Undertaking the Role of Skilled Persons
Section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 deals with the powers of 
the UK's financial services regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), to obtain a report 
by a skilled person (also referred to as a reporting accountant) to assist the FSA in performing its 
functions under the FSMA 2000.
In addition to its powers to appoint skilled persons to carry out certain functions under section 
166, sections 167 and 168 of the Act also empower the FSA to appoint competent persons to 
carry out investigative tasks.
The differences between the roles of skilled persons (also known as reporting accountants) and 
competent persons, are demonstrated by the bearer of the costs for work carried out by these 
persons. For work undertaken by skilled persons, the regulated firm (who employs them) bears 
the cost directly whilst for work undertaken by competent persons, the FSA bears the cost.27
According to Singh (2003), even though skilled persons are usually approved by the FSA, the 
role  is  usually  performed  by  auditors  of  the  regulated  firm.28 This  “raises  the  question  of 
26 See European Commision, “Ownership Rules of Audit Firms and their Consequences For Audit Market 
Concentration” at page 166
27
2
 See J Hitchins, M Hogg and D Mallet Banking: A Regulatory Accounting and Auditing Guide  Institute of 
Chartered Accountants England and Wales (2001) at page 295
28
 See D Singh, The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision (2003) 4(3) Journal of 
International Banking Regulation at page 9
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independence since both roles of auditors of the regulated firm and skilled persons (or reporting 
accountants)  employed  by  the  regulator  (the  FSA)  are  distinct  roles  which  still  overlap 
occasionally.29 The use of skilled persons' reports has been controversial and concerns have been 
expressed in  relation to  the FSA using a  skilled person's  report  instead of  devoting its  own 
resources to investigating a matter.”30
Certain measures have been adopted to safeguard against possibilities of a conflict of interest 
arising between the auditors of the regulated firm who are commissioned by the FSA as skilled 
persons but paid by the regulated firm. Chapter Five of the FSA Supervision Manual provides 
examples of circumstances where the FSA may use skilled persons. According to chapter five of 
the Supervision Manual, the FSA states that firms are to appoint skilled persons only for specific 
purposes,  not  to  use  them as  a  matter  of  routine,  to  use  skilled  persons  only  after  having 
considered alternatives, to use skilled persons because of the added value to be gained due to 
their expertise or knowledge and not because of resource restraints, and to take into account cost 
implications as well as using the tool in a focused and proportionate way. 
E. Conclusion
It  has  been demonstrated that  certain  capacities exist  in  which the dual  role  of  the external 
auditor (in undertaking internal audit roles as well as skilled persons roles) could be immensely 
beneficial to an entity or organisation. This arises as a result of the invaluable skills and expertise 
which such a role provides and incorporates into the audit process. Even where such an exercise 
of a dual role is prohibited by law or as a result of organisational policies, opportunities exist 
whereby close cooperation between external and internal auditors could provide for increased 
scope in implementing and benefiting from each other's work. The opportunities and benefits of 
drawing on the skills and expertise gained by an external auditor who has acquired so much 
29
2
 See ibid
30
3
 See ibid at page 135
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knowledge by virtue of  the exercise  of  both roles and the experience acquired from having 
exercised such roles, should not be under estimated.
As  recommended  in  chapter  five  of  the  Supervision  Manual  of  the  FSA,  there  are  certain 
situations whereby such a dual role may not be warranted, where such dual roles should not be 
exercised routinely, where such dual role should only be implemented after having considered 
other alternatives, and more importantly, why such dual role could contribute and generate added 
value by virtue of the increased expertise or knowledge which such a dual role brings. Where 
concerns relating to a compromise of independence and objectivity arise, then prohibitions and 
restrictions imposed by section 201 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act are, to a great extent, justified.
As stated previously in this paper, under section B, a return to and focus on traditional auditing 
techniques, as well as auditing techniques which focus on internal controls is a much needed 
move - whilst also supporting (internal) audits which to a greater extent, take into consideration, 
strategic and operational controls. Such a stance would be greatly facilitated in cases where an 
external auditor is able to undertake certain permitted internal audit responsibilities.
As is particularly the case with external auditors, the reliability of internal controls also plays a 
huge and crucial role in the audit process - as well as those in charge of those internal controls. 
Where safeguards such as the segregation of duties and other measures are incorporated into the 
process  to  reduce  instances  or  situations  whereby such controls  could  be  manipulated,  then 
benefits of having an external auditor serve in a dual role capacity may well extend beyond its 
stated disadvantages. 
Benefits  accruing from having a dual  role  include namely the acquisition of knowledge and 
expertise gained during the latter stages of the process - which could assist in providing more 
accurate judgments during latter stages of the process. This is also similar to the position which 
exists with external auditors: whereby the mandatory rotation of audit firms, whilst serving to 
ensure that independence and objectivity is not compromised, could also be detrimental where 
the external auditor leaves the firm shortly/prematurely after having been employed by the firm. 
In the case of internal audit outsourcing, the efficiency of financial audits is bolstered because 
the auditor is able to benefit from knowledge gained during the performance of internal audit 
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functions.  The auditor is able to gain a better understanding of the client’s internal controls 
because the auditor has had close experience with the internal control environment as part of the 
client’s internal audit function.
The firm incurs greater costs in employing a new auditor in re acquiring the knowledge which 
the previous auditor had acquired - having left the firm prematurely.  Further, the knowledge 
which could have been employed by the leaving auditor is not fully maximised in the process.
Up till 2013, there had been no requirement at European level for the mandatory rotation of audit 
firms  –  even  though  some  member  states  had  gone  further  than  Article  42  of  Directive 
2006/43/EC  in  requiring  mandatory  audit  firm  rotation.  This  however,  has  changed  with 
mandatory requirement – pursuant to a draft law that would “require public-interest entities such 
as banks, insurance firms, and listed companies to rotate audit firms every 14 years”(and such 
period could be extended to 25 years when certain safeguards are put into place).31 Other notable 
features of the Draft Law also include:32
− Prohibition of “Big Four-only” contractual clauses that require a company’s audit to be 
done by one of the Big Four accounting firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and 
PwC). 
− Requirement that auditors of public-interest entities (PIEs) publish audit reports 
according to international standards and provide shareholders and investors with a 
detailed understanding of what the auditor did and an overall assurance of the accuracy of 
the company’s accounts. 
31  “The idea of mandatory audit firm rotation also is being explored elsewhere. The UK Competition Commission 
is considering imposing term limits for large listed companies and will come to a final decision by Oct. 20.
In the United States, the PCAOB has been studying the issue of mandatory audit firm rotation for public 
companies since issuing a concept release that included the topic in August 2011. However, a PCAOB member 
has also highlighted  that many obstacles make adoption of mandatory audit firm rotation unlikely.”
K Tysiac, „Europe Takes Step Toward Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation“, Journal of Accountancy  April 2013 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/20137862.htm
32 See ibid
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− Prohibition of audit firms from providing non-audit services that could jeopardize 
independence.
Whether the distinction between those non audit services which are not considered to impair 
independence is effective, logical and justified, constitutes the basis for arguments which counter 
the basis for prohibition of certain non audit services – pursuant to legislation such as section 
201of  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  and  Ethical  Standard  5  (Revised)  of  the  APB.  Partnership 
engagements between one audit firm providing audit services solely and exclusively, and another 
firm offering non audit  services, provided ethical  standards on objectivity,  independence and 
integrity are complied with, may achieve better results – provided other safeguards are well in 
place.
Proposals,  legislation and efforts  aimed at  encouraging  partnerships  between Big Four  audit 
firms and mid tier firms are also welcomed, as well as external investments in mid tier audit 
firms are welcomed – provided that audit quality is retained.
Even though concerns persist that there would be a constraint in the global growth of EU audit 
firms (owned by external investors) who collaborate in a “network structure” with U.S auditors – 
such constraint being attributed to application of U.S rules, as already highlighted in this paper, 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act has already influenced many countries – by virtue of U.S listing rules' 
applicability  in  these  jurisdictions.  Hence  such  collaboration  as  embodied  by  such  network 
structure should not be considered a threat to the world wide growth of such firms. Furthermore, 
rules or covenants could be agreed upon by such firms – where undue restrictions are likely to be 
foreseen.
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